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In many regions of the world, property rights to natural resources are held under various forms of communal 
ownership, which often exhibit flexibility for users to access different resources depending on relative need. 
Here, we analyze the impact of climatic variability on resource use, and examine the transactions cost of 
access in these flexible systems. 
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In the semi-arid regions of north-central Kenya, livestock owners rely on access to multiple 
pastures and water resources.  Land tenure in this region can best be described as ranging 
from common to open access, though the state is the de facto owner of land.  It has been 
argued by a number of authors that mobility and the capacity to access a wide range of 
resources is required in regions characterized by high spatial and temporal variation in 
rainfall (Sandford 1983, Coppock 1984, Niamir-Fuller 1999, Behnke & Scoones 1993).  
Common tenure systems or even open access regimes enable this type of pastoral system to 
support a large number of people while keeping transactions costs of mobility and 
flexibility to a minimum.  Of course, flexible access for large numbers of users may also 
lead to over-use of a resource in the absence of well-functioning resource management 
institutions.  
 
In most studies of mobility, the benefits to mobility are presented in terms of increased 
average returns to, and decreased variability of, livestock production, and the costs are those 
associated with transportation of animals.  The potential for over-use is largely assumed 
away (van den Brink et al., 1995).  Furthermore, in analytical analyses, access rights are 
generally considered complete and non-contingent.  In the descriptive literature, however, 
there is a good deal of discussion regarding negotiated access, secondary and tertiary access 
rights, reciprocal rights of use, and access based on relatively poor rainfall realizations. 
 
In this paper, we develop an empirical model based on a theoretical framework of 
incomplete and contingent access rights using fuzzy set theory developed in Goodhue and 
McCarthy (1999).  This model enables us to capture the empirical phenomenon of 
incomplete and contingent access as recorded in the literature cited above, and as a basis for 
testing whether or not similar patterns of access and use characterize the situation in 
northern Kenya.  In the following section, we review existing empirical literature on herd 
mobility, present in more detail the conceptual model of fuzzy access rights and herd 
mobility, and conclude with testable hypotheses regarding the factors affecting household-
level decisions on herd mobility.  In the third section, we present descriptive statistics of 
herd mobility and waterpoint use undertaken by households in six communities located in 
northern Kenya.  We compare data on mobility during the drought year of 1991-92 and the 
1999-2000 year, which is considered to have been an above-normal rainfall year for the 
region as a whole.   In the fourth section, we present results of an ordered logit model, 
where the number of waterpoints used is estimated as a function of household-level 
variables and community-level waterpoint characteristics.  In the fifth section, we conclude 
by considering extensions to the empirical work.   
 
2.  Literature Review and Conceptual Framework:  Herd Mobility 
 
It is widely accepted that traditional rangeland management systems based on mobility 
enabled herders to engage in opportunistic grazing strategies that both increased average 
herd productivity and reduced riskiness of production resulting from climatic variability 
(Niamir-Fuller  1999, Bovin and Manger 1990, Scoones 1995, Freudenberger & 
Freudenberger 1993).   It is also posited that traditional systems reduce transactions costs 
associated with accessing range resources, thus enabling resource users to fully benefit from   3
flexibility in responding to climatic variability.  In order to cope with climatic variability, 
pastoral systems are not only flexible in the number of options open for mobility, but also 
with respect to other inputs such as feed substitutes, labor allocation, etc. (Ngaido, 1999).   
Except in a very few instances, pastoral families are likely to be engaged in a wide-range of 
activities, and these opportunities may also influence benefits and costs of livestock 
production as well as incentives for mobility (Toulmin 1983, Bonfiglioli, 1990). 
 
In the early 1990￿s, the ￿New Rangeland Ecology￿ (NRE) school of thought developed, 
which focused on flexibility and mobility -- a departure from the classical paradigm of 
rangeland management, which is thought to have underestimated the importance of mobility 
(O￿Connor & Roux, 1995 Hiernaux, 1996, Behnke Scoones and Kerven 1993).  Proponents 
of NRE maintain that climate variability is the major factor determining vegetation 
availability and structure; grazing pressure is held to have very little effect on forage 
characteristics except in extremely densely populated settlement areas (i.e. around 
boreholes).  Though generally ignoring the impact of grazing pressure on animal 
productivity and severity of drought in terms of animal production, proponents have still 
argued cogently about benefits of mobility in terms of using range resources more 
efficiently via ￿opportunistic￿ grazing strategies (Sandford, 1983) and in terms of reducing 
variance in animal production due to spatial variability in climatic conditions. 
 
Niamir-Fuller (1999) considers factors affecting spatial and temporal components of 
mobility -- such as distance and timing of mobility ￿ which include water and forage 
availability, localized climatic conditions, potential economies of scale in communal 
herding and drawing water at wells, and political factors such as relations between pastoral 
communities, and between pastoralists and non-pastoral communities (Niamir-Fuller, 
1999).  Kerven and Cox￿s study (1996), based on interviews of pastoralists in southern 
Ethiopia, identifies water during the dry season ￿ not forage ￿ as the major constraint to 
mobility (see also Coppock, 1994).  Still, forage is often an important constraint; Smith et 
al. (2001) reports that pastoralists in northern Kenya ranked water and forage as the most 
important constraints. 
 
The historical reduction in mobility in pastoral areas has been ascribed to various factors, 
including major droughts with devastating livestock losses, government policies promoting 
sedenterization, public investments in fixed-location rural services (health clinics, school 
buildings), population growth and expansion of agriculture, rural violence, and growing 
economic vulnerability of pastoral groups due to policies favoring agriculture (Niamir 
Fuller, 1999).  Some researchers also believe that land use changes precipitated by borehole 
development in the 1960￿s and 1970￿s changed land values and triggered ￿enclosure￿ 
movements which further constrained mobility of herds (Behnke, R. 1988).  
 
Considering the drought cycle specifically, Toulmin (1988) describes traditional pastoral 
strategies during the cycle as occurring in four stages ￿ 1) dry year, leading to 2) drought 
year, 3) recovery stage, and 4) ￿normal￿ conditions stage.  Toulmin maintains that herders 
first attempt to increase their mobility in response to low rainfall realizations, and perhaps 
to further diversify species held; they may also rely on reciprocal claims to resources 
(financial, labor, pasture, other natural resources, etc.) with wealthier kin or clan members.  
As conditions worsen, some herders attempt to sell certain animals, but by this time, it is 
hypothesized, prices have generally dropped and animals are generally in poor condition.  
Some families may try and send members in search of wage work, or famine relief camps if 
these exist.  As the drought ends, those with stock remaining attempt to recover as quickly   4
as possible, meaning that offtake is likely to be at its lowest.  Also, prices may rise during 
this period
1.  This is followed by the ￿normal￿ period, where both herd sizes and offtake 
increase.  Unfortunately very little empirical data on mobility in different rainfall years 
exist. 
 
To summarize, mobility is believed to be one of the most components of pastoralist 
strategies, though issues surrounding access to, and management of, natural resources have 
generally been down-played or simply ignored, even in areas facing major violent conflicts 
over access to resources.  In this section, we will present a conceptual framework for 
analyzing access rights to resources that focuses quite specifically on the nature of access 
rights and how these operate in pastoral areas. 
 
First, we consider that herders choose whether or not to move to a new pasture area 
depending not only on their own access rights to that new area, but on the access rights of 
other herders as well.  Thus, the decision to move to new areas will depend on your absolute 
access rights and also on your rights relative to all others with some rights to various 
resources; the greater your absolute and relative rights, the more mobile you will be.  Also, 
we expect that the number of points accessed will increase when ￿transit￿ costs decline; that 
is to say, in years with average or above-average rainfall, we would expect more points to 
be accessed because water and forage resources are likely to be more readily available both 
at the water point and while in transit.  Furthermore, if access rights are contingent on 
relative rainfall realizations (i.e. if my access rights are ￿greater￿ when my area receives a 
relatively bad rainfall realization), then we would expect more points to be accessed by 
households living in areas with relatively poor realizations.   Note the direct and indirect 
effects of rainfall; higher rainfall in a region directly reduces transit costs for all pastoralists, 
but relative access rights will be equalized, which may lead to less mobility.  To summarize, 
we expect mobility to be highest for those households in areas with relatively poor rainfall 
realizations but that are also located in regions that received relatively good rainfall.   
Alternatively, we expect mobility to be lowest when rainfall is generally poor, but one￿s 
particular area received relatively favorable rainfall.  In between are the cases where rainfall 
is generally poor and is bad in your core grazing area, and where rainfall is generally good 
and good in your core grazing area.  In terms of drought vs. non-drought years, we 
hypothesize that mobility will be lower in drought years, since many observers hypothesize 
that drought years are characterized by uniformly poor rainfall realizations.  Instead, 
mobility will be greater during years of average or above-average rainfall, to the extent that 
idiosyncratic differences in rainfall realizations are more prominent during these years. 
 
Note that the benefits of flexible access rights in terms of both improved mean incomes and 
reduced variability of incomes comes from increased and less costly mobility during years 
characterized by idiosyncratic rainfall realizations.  Because many authors believe that the 
benefits to mobility are most important for mitigating the impact of drought, it is important 
to try and characterize whether factors influencing the mobility decision differ depending on 
whether it is a drought or ￿normal￿ year
2. 
                                                             
1 Data on livestock ￿prices￿ are nearly always revenue per head.  And, it is not at all clear whether lower 
revenues per head are due to some exogenous drop in demand, or rather, if the quality and size of animals sold 
declines.   In fact, its like saying the price of maize dropped by 50%, when you first sold a 100 kg. bag, but 
next sold a 50 kg. bag.  Though most people would find this outrageous when discussing crops, the literature 
referring to livestock prices almost uniformly ignores this.  
2 Technically (and by simply looking at the descriptive statistics), it seems that we will certainly have 
￿identification￿ problems in terms of separating out factors affecting the ￿demand￿ versus the ￿supply￿ of 
access to waterpoints.   5
 
To test hypotheses regarding mobility, rainfall received and variation in rainfall, in section 
3, we first present statistics on rainfall and normalized difference vegetation indices (NDVI) 
statistics in six different areas of northern Kenya:  North Horr (NH), Kargi (KA), Loglogo 
(LL), Dirib Gombo (DG), Suguta Marmar (SM) and N￿Gudas (NG).  We present 
information on long-term averages, coefficients of variation, and NDVI information for 
1992 and 1999.  In section 4, we consider actual patterns of mobility undertaken by 
households in 1992 vs. 1999; extensive data was collected by project members of the 
Global-Livestock Collaborative Research Support Program: (what is their actual title?).  In 
this section, we also consider indicators of how costly it is to move (in terms of negotiating 
access, making exchanges, or abiding by limits), and relate these indicators to NDVI and 
spatial variability indicators from section 3.  We can thus examine whether or not mobility 
is ￿less￿ costly in areas with relatively high but spatially variable rainfall.  In section 5, we 
can present results of a statistical analysis of factors affecting mobility in 1999.   
 
3.  Descriptive Statistics of Spatial and Temporal Mobility 
 
In this section, we present some basic descriptive rainfall and normalized difference 
vegetation index (NDVI) statistics. NDVI is a measure of photosynthesis activity of 
vegetation obtained from satellite images and  is calculated from the near infrared 
and red bands: NDVI = (Near Infrared - Red)/( Near Infrared Red).  The available 
time series data on rainfall can be quite poor for much of Africa because weather 
stations are sparse, particularly in the semi-arid and arid regions.  Additionally, 
standard techniques for estimating rainfall surface data rely on interpolation 
measures that calculate estimated rainfall between two stations by various 
￿smoothing￿ techniques, meaning that spatial variability is likely well under-
estimated in these series.  On the other hand, long time-series data of NDVIs are 
also available.  While there is a positive correlation between rainfall and NDVI, 
NDVI may itself be a function of human behavior as well as rainfall.  For instance, 
increased cropping or bush encroachment due to improper grazing pressure may 
increase NDVI, but it would decrease available forage, and may also increase 
variability in available forage. Despite problems of comparing NDVI and rainfall in 
terms of levels, we nonetheless posit that measures of spatial variation constructed 
using NDVI data suffer fewer potential problems of endogeneity, and use these data 
in the analyses that follow.  Table 1 gives long-term average mean rainfall 
(Hutchinson 2001), the average and coefficient of variation of NDVI over the past 
18 years, and average NDVI for the months of May and August (Clark Labs, 2000).   
In general, May is the wettest month of the year, whereas August is generally the 
driest month. 
 
Table 1:  LONG TERM RAINFALL AND NDVI VALUES 
+: data source: Hutchinson.  
















NH  230  37.0700 3.3240 92 0.0712 103  88 
KA  319  37.5739 2.4991 105 0.0715  117  97 
LL  422  37.9055 2.0131 133 0.1170  156  114 
    DG  625 38.0591  2.2972 135  0.1132  167  113 
 SM  542  36.6830 0.8360 162 0.0671  177  166 
NG 609  36.0667  0.5000 166  0.0611  183  181   6
  
 
North Horr (NH) and Dirib Gombo (DG) receive the lowest and highest average rainfall, 
respectively; and, average NDVI correlates strongly with the rainfall data, with the 
exception of Dirib Gombo, which has only the third highest average NDVI.  In fact, Dirib 
Gombo is located close to Mt. Marsabit, which receives the highest rainfall in the area; the 
high rainfall figure, obtained by interpolating rainfall data, may overestimate rainfall in the 
nearby, but lower-lying surrounding areas such as Dirib Gombo.  The coefficient of 
variation of average annual NDVI (NDVI CV), yields the observation that NH, which is the 
driest region in the study area, also exhibits very low NDVI CV.  The coefficient of 
variation is quite high in the ￿medium￿ rainfall region of LL, and also high in the highest 
rainfall region, DG.  A quick look at average NDVIs in the wettest (May) and driest 
(August) months of the year, found in the last two columns of the table, highlights the fact 
that monthly NDVIs are indeed higher during wet (May) months and lower during dry 
(August) months, and that the rank of communities remains overall unchanged for both 
months compared with the annual average.   
 
Spatial variation and ￿patchiness￿ 
 
In order to account for spatial variation in landscapes between communities we used NDVI 
data obtained from Clark Labs to generate fragmentation statistics. We analyzed an area of 
40 km radius around each of the 6 communities, since the majority of herd movements fell 
within this area. We define spatial variation in two ways: first using 36 absolute categories 
of NDVI values (36 fixed equal range categories
4) and a second using relative categories (9 
categories of variable range
5).  We consider that each category corresponds to a different 
￿patch type￿. The first approach allows us the compare overall patchiness across 
communities, while the second approach looks at the relative patchiness of a particular area, 
which may be a better measure on which to compare movements of herds within a given 
area between drought vs. non-drought years. We also constructed two sets of maps of NDVI 
values for the 40 km radius area, one for the 36 absolute categories (each color corresponds 
to the same NDVI range for all six regions), and another set for the 9 relative categories 
(colors are map specific). 
 
We next constructed 2 different landscape level fragmentation indices: the aggregation 
index (AI), which measures the mean value of degree of disaggregation of different patch 
types in the landscape, and the contagion (CONT) index, which measures both dispersion 
and interspersion; both defined more fully below. The indices were constructed for both 
landscape characterizations based on absolute (36) and relative categories (9). We 
calculated the indices for 4 months (March, March, August, December), which are on 





                                                             
3 The correlation coefficient for NDVI of the community center coordinate and Hutchinson rain data is 0.9950, 
while the correlation coefficient for NDVI average over 40km radius around the community and the 
Hutchinson rain data is 0.8815.  
4 We use 36 categories, so that the more uniform areas still include at least three different categories 
5 9 equally spaced categories within the NDVI range of the specific area (maxNDVI-minNDVI). Assignment 
of category follows the Jenks optimisation method (Jenks, 1967). Thus each map has 9 categories but ranges 















=   →   ∑       
where: 
gii   =   number of like adjacencies (joins) between pixels of patch type (class) i 
based on the single-count method. 
max-gii  =   maximum number of like adjacencies (joins) between pixels of patch type 
(class) i (see below) based on the single-count method. 
Pi   =    proportion of landscape comprised of patch type (class) i. 
 
range: 0 ≤ AI ≤ 100 
 
Given any Pi, AI equals 0 when the patch types are completely disaggregated (i.e., no like 
adjacencies), while AI increases as the landscape is increasingly aggregated. When the 
landscape is completely uniform it equals 100.  
The AI index at the landscape level is computed as an area-weighted mean class 
aggregation index, and each class is weighted by the proportion of area covered in the 























   
   
    ⊗
   









Pi =proportion of the landscape occupied by patch type (class) i. 
gik =number of adjacencies (joins) between pixels of patch types (classes) i and k based on 
the double-count method. 
m =number of patch types (classes) present in the landscape, including the landscape border 
if present. 
 
range: 0 < CONT ≤ 100 
 
CONT is close to 0 when the patch types are very disaggregated (i.e., every cell is different 
patch type) and interspersed (equal proportions of all pairwise adjacencies). When all patch 
types are maximally aggregated the index is equal to 100 (e.g. only one patch).  If a single 
class occupies much of the landscape, the index is high, and low otherwise. This index  is 
affected by both the dispersion and interspersion of patch types. Low levels of dispersion   8
(i.e., high proportion of like adjacencies) and low levels interspersion (i.e., inequitable 
distribution of pairwise adjacencies) results in high contagion. (McGarigal et al. 2002) 
 
Table 2:  SPATIAL VARIABILITY 
1992               
   AI  36  CONT 36  AI 9  CONT 9  Ndvi 40km 
Mean 
NH  63.3  30.2  42.1 22.8 89.3
KA  52.3  33.2  55.6 34.3 98.4
LL  41.8  37.5  63.5 43.9 114.5
DG  39.4  30.4  58.0 34.4 115.2
SM  34.5  24.0  43.9 24.5 143.1
NG  28.5  18.1  38.9 16.7 151.7
1999               
   AI  36  CONT36  AI 9  CONT9  Ndvi 40km 
Mean 
NH  53.0  31.0  45.6 27.9 91.3
KA  44.9  34.5  66.6 42.0 105.3
LL  26.8  26.9  49.9 30.2 134.2
DG  33.0  28.9  51.3 30.0 132.0
SM  39.1  22.8  43.3 22.1 159.5
NG  31.8  20.6  38.9 18.7 163.8
 
 
Figures for AI and CONT presented in Table 2 above are the average of the four monthly 
values; monthly data were highly correlated, with exception of a few pairs for the optimized 
category case in 1992.  We first note that whereas the contagion indices and the aggregation 
index using the 9 optimised categories perform similarly, the aggregation index using the 36 
standard categories performs quite differently.    We have highlighted the boxes where 
spatial variation is higher when comparing the two years; for instance, all AI and CONT 
indices for LL and DG are lower in 1999 vs. 1992, so these are shaded.  It is striking that, 
while mean NDVI is uniformly higher in 1999 as expected, measures of spatial variation do 
not correlate with drought vs. non-drought conditions.  According to the contagion and 9 
category aggregation indices, spatial variability is higher in 1999 in the three mid-level 
average ndvi areas, which means that spatial variability is lower in the non-drought year in 
the highest ndvi and two lowest ndvi areas.  Also interesting to note is the fact that spatial 
variation is generally lower in the drier areas in any year, except for the driest area, NH.   
 
Yet another aspect to consider is seasonal variation.  Though the spatial variation measures 
were correlated across months, such information does not sufficiently capture differences in 
seasonal variability through the year.  As an indicator of seasonal variability, we calculate 
the coefficient of variation of average monthly NDVI throughout the year.  Table 3 below 
presents a summary of the intra-annual NDVI CV information for 1992 and 1999. 
   9
Table3:  NDVI and TEMPORAL DIFFERENCES 
 












NH and KA exhibit very low NDVI CV in both time periods, but whereas KA exhibits 
moderately low spatial variation, NH exhibits fairly high spatial variation, particularly in the 
drought year.  DG has the highest seasonal variability, but exhibits consistently low spatial 
variability.  LL and NG both exhibit high seasonal variation, but LL is relatively spatially 
homogeneous, whereas NG is generally the most spatially variable.  Comparing 1992 and 
1999, while the NDVI average is uniformly higher in 1999, the CV is higher only for LL 
and DG.  Thus, there is little correlation between drought and non-drought years and 
patterns of seasonal variability. 
  
To summarize, NDVI indices are uniformly higher in 1999 vs. 1992, as we expect. 
However, differences in variability, both seasonal and spatial, do not correlate as well with 
drought vs. non-drought conditions, but do correlate well with each other.  Given the 
observed pattern of spatial and seasonal variability, we expect that mobility will be less 
costly in 1999 versus 1992 in DG and LL, and, to a lesser extent, in SM; and is likely to be 
more costly in NH , KA, and NG.   
 
4.  Descriptive Statistics of Permission, Exchanges, and Limits, by Area 
 
In this section, we present descriptive statistics on the different waterpoints accessed by 
households, as well as data on the number of total waterpoints visited by households.  The 
number of different waterpoints accessed by households is not necessarily the same as the 
number of visits by households to waterpoints, since in many cases, households visited the 
same waterpoint more than once during the year.  We also distinguish between mobility of 
the base camp herd (near the village) versus the satellite herd (more remote pastures) (c.f. 
McPeak 2000).  We make the distinction since factors driving mobility may differ between 
base and satellite camps, primarily because base camp movements may be affected by the 
crop cycle, whereas satellite camp movements take place largely outside the cropped areas.   
 
In section 2, we hypothesized that access rights may either be incomplete and/or state 
contingent.   We do not directly observe whether access and use rights are incomplete, but 
observe whether or not permission was required to access a waterpoint, whether limits were 
imposed on households using certain waterpoints, and whether exchanges (in terms of 
money or animals transfers) were required to access the resource.  We hypothesize that 
requesting permission, making exchanges, and facing restrictions/limits on use all constitute 
transactions costs of accessing and using waterpoint resources and surrounding pastures.  
Alternatively, where these transactions costs are zero, we consider rights to be complete. 
 
In order to check for state contingent rights, we consider the difference in these transactions 
costs between 1992 and 1999.  Given the NDVI and rainfall data presented above, we   10
expect that, if rights are state contingent, transactions costs should be somewhat lower in 
1999 in NH, KA, and LL because of generally higher spatial variability and higher average 
rainfall.  Transactions cost may be higher or lower in DG, SM, and NG; these areas also 
received higher average rainfall, but spatial and seasonal variability was lower in 1999 vs. 
1992.  
 
Before proceeding to the transactions costs statistics, we present basic statistics on the 
number and types of waterpoints used in each of the six communities, differentiating 




Tables 4 and 5 give data on waterpoints used for base camp in 1992 and 1999.  The first 
five columns give data on the number of waterpoints used by type of waterpoint ￿ surface, 
















NH 31  24  7  0  90 
KA 9  8  1  0  28 
LL 13  5  1  5  21 
DG 10  5  0  5  46 
SM 33  18  10  4  51 



















NH 27 18 7  0  104 
KA 8 5  1  2  88 
LL 21 2  9 10 67 
DG 9 6  1  2  41 
SM  36  11  15 10 60 
NG 15  2  11  2  58 
 
 
                                                             
6 Here, we should say something about number of points visited in 2000, noting that we just don￿t have the 
corresponding NDVI or rainfall data for 2000, but with the exception of Kargi, the number of points visited 
within a region and the number of visits to different waterpoints is indeed higher in 1999  
than 2000, with the exception of Kargi; statistics presented in an Appendix ??.   11
Starting with Base Camp 1992, we see that SM has the greatest total number of points used.  
This is followed by NH and LL, and in turn by DG and KA.  Herders in NG rely heavily on 
surface waterpoints; even in the drought year of 1992, people of NG relied upon only two 
non-surface points.  In 1999 (B99), the ranking of communities by total number of 
waterpoints used remains the same as in 1992 (B92).  However, in three of the 
communities, slightly fewer waterpoints were accessed in B99 (DG, KA, and NH), whereas 
total number of waterpoints accessed increases slightly for NG and SM, and rather 
substantially for LL.   In particular in LL, the number of boreholes accessed by households 
increases substantially from B92 to B99.  Also whereas only one surface waterpoint was 
mentioned in LL in B92, 10 different surface waterpoints were mentioned in 1999.  In fact, 
one would have expected that surface water point use would have increased substantially in 
1999 vis-￿-vis 1992; however, while this is generally true, the increase is only dramatic in 
the case of LL.   
 
Whereas the total number of waterpoints accessed exhibits no general trend, the total 
number of visits by households does show a general increase.  In fact, number of visits 
increases in five of the six communities, and does so dramatically in KA and LL.   Number 
of visits actually decreases slightly in 1999 in DG.  Thus, total base camp visits only 
roughly follow our predictions. 
 
Transaction Costs of Mobility 
 
Transaction costs are proxied here by the need to ask permission to access a waterpoint, by 
the presence of limits to the use of the waterpoint and the need to pay (cash or livestock) for 
access. Here we present in turn the descriptive statistics of permission, limits and exchanges 
for 1992 and 1999. First we present statistics on the number of waterpoints at which at least 
one household asked permission, and the number of household visits to waterpoints where 
the household had to ask permission.  This is followed by information on the number of 
points and the number of household visits where households faced limits or restrictions on 
accessing various resources and information on whether exchanges occurred so that a 
household could gain access a waterpoint.  We note that, for both limits and exchanges, 
information is presented on the subset of waterpoints where permission was required.     
 
 


















DG  10  8  2  0 46  6 40 87 
KA  9  2  3  3 28 14  8 29 
LL  13  0  0 13 21 20  0  0 
NG  11  0  2  9 43 39  2  5 
NH  31  20  2  9 90 23 60 67 
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Table 6b:  Permission by Water Point and by Household, Base Camp 1999 (B99) 
 
















DG  9 8  1  0  41  4 35 85 
KA  8 2  3  3  88 44 39 44 
LL  21  0  0  21  67  64 0 0 
NG 15  2  1  12  58  54 3 5 
NH  27  18  5  4  104 26 67 64 
SM 36  0  0  34  60  58 0 0 
 
In 1992, permission was required by all water users at 8 out of 10 points in DG, 20 of 31 in 
NH, and 2 out of 9 water points in KA.  Furthermore, in DG, KA, NG and NH, there was at 
least one point where some households requested permission and some did not (the ￿Perm 
Mixed￿ column).  No permission was requested by any household in LL; and was required 
at only one point in SM.    This coincides fairly well with data on the number of times 
households asked permission to access a waterpoint.  In KA, however, though 56% of the 
water points mentioned by survey respondents required permission (if we consider the 
￿mixed￿ points), only 29% of respondents asked permission at any watering point, 
indicating that the non-permission points were used slightly more frequently.  
 
Data on permission to access base camp waterpoints in 1999 is very similar to that for 1992.  
Number of points where permission was required by all users declined in NH, but the 
number of ￿mixed yes/no￿ waterpoints increased by three, and the number of waterpoints 
where permission was not required declined by four.   As noted above, the number of visits 
by households increases substantially in 1999 vs. 1992, except for DG, but the percent of 
households requesting permission remains very similar, except in the case of KA, where 
requesting permission actually increases.  We note that we expect transactions costs to be 
higher in KA in 1999, since both spatial and seasonal variation are lower in that year. 
 
In Tables 7a,b and 8a,b, data is presented on limits and exchanges, for the subset of 
waterpoints where permission was required.  Tables 7a,b give data for limits, and 8a,b for 
exchanges. 
 
Table 7a:  Limits where Permission is Required, B92  
 Waterpoints Households 










% of hh￿s 
facing 
Limits 
DG 3  3  4  40  11  28 
KA 2  2  1 8  5  62 
LL n/a n/a  n/a n/a  n/a  n/a 
NG 1  0  1 2  1  50 
NH 3  2  17  60  5  8 
SM 1  0  0 1  1  100 
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Table 7b:  Limits where Permission is Required, B99       
 Waterpoints Households 










% of hh￿s 
facing 
Limits 
DG 1  3  1  35  11  31 
KA 3  1  1  39  28  72 
LL  n/a n/a  n/a  0  n/a n/a 
NG 1  0  2 3  1  33 
NH  3 2  18  67  6 9 
SM  n/a n/a  n/a  0  n/a n/a 
 
At nearly half the waterpoints in DG and KA, some limits were imposed on at least some 
users; it is interesting to note that these are precisely those communities with the least total 
number of waterpoints accessed.  Limits were also imposed at five points in NH in both 
1992 and 1999.   In fact, in terms of waterpoints, there is a very slight decrease in the total 
number of waterpoints where at least one household faced limits.  The number of 
households facing limits actually increases, but this is mainly due to a dramatic increase in 
limits in KA.   
 
Table 8a:  Exchanges where Permission is Required, B92  
  Waterpoints Households 











% of hh￿s 
that Gave 
DG 10  0  0  40  40  100 
KA  0  0 5  8 0  0 
LL n/a  n/a  n/a  0  n/a  n/a 
NG  1  0 1  2 1  50 
NH  0  1 21 60 1  2 
SM  1  0 0  1 1  100 
   
 
Table 8b:  Exchanges where Permission is Required, B99       
 Waterpoints  Households 











% of hh￿s 
that Gave 
DG 4  1  0  35  34  97 
KA 1  1  3  39  8  21 
LL n/a  n/a  n/a  0 n/a  n/a 
NG 1  0  2  3  1  33 
NH 0  1  22  67  1  1 
SM n/a  n/a  n/a  0 n/a  n/a   
 
 
Regarding whether households had to give something in order to access the water point 
(cash, animals, both), we see that this is quite limited, mainly to DG, where a transaction   14
occurred at every waterpoint where permission was required. However, there was but one 
household in NG and another in SM required to pay in order to access a water point in 
1992.  In both of these cases, oddly enough, the head of household was female.  The 
number of households required to give something fell in 1999 in DG, but actually increased 
in KA.  This too roughly corresponds with predictions; again, conditions were much less 
variable in time and space in KA in 1999, but were relatively  more variable in DG in 1999. 
 
Also interesting to note is that in DG in 1992, of the 40 times households were required to 
give something, 11 times they also faced limits (about 28%); in 1999, of the 34 times 
households gave something, 7 times they faced limits (about 21% of the time).   
 
A few interesting points arise from the above descriptive statistics.  First, permission, 
payment for access, and limits were all higher in DG and KA, where the total number of 
points used was the lowest.  Secondly, whereas permission is required of almost all 
households in NH ￿ where there were many water points mentioned --  exchanges and 
limits applied at far fewer of the waterpoints.  This contrasts with SM, which is also 
characterized by many water points.  In SM, neither permission, nor payments nor limits 
were important.   Unlike households in NH, households in SM have access to many surface 
water points ￿ though they still appear to rely on wells too.   Households in NG relied 
almost exclusively on surface water during 1992 for base camp animals; permission was 
required at only two points.  In LL, no permission was  required at any waterpoint; though, 
evidence suggests that households do pay for petrol to operate the equipment at the 
boreholes there.  It may also be the case that households have to ￿pay￿ to use the machine 
dug and operated boreholes in terms of maintenance or other fees; unfortunately, we have 
no further information on this. 
 
At this point, we might step back and consider some of the hypotheses regarding mobility 
stemming from the flexible access rights model.  Recall that we hypothesize that, for any 
household, the number of waterpoints accessed will increase when transit costs of mobility 
decline and when access costs decrease.  One would expect that in 1999, more resources 
would be more readily available ￿along the way￿, so that more points should have been 
accessed.  Access rights at the household level should be relatively stronger in DG, LL and 
SM, so that this should also reinforce the increase in number of points used due to lower 
transit costs. While the data generally supports these hypotheses, differences between base 
camp movements in 92 vs. 99 are quite limited in terms of percentage of points requiring 
permission, exchanges or limits, or in percentage of households facing permission, 
exchanges or limits.  The biggest difference is in the total number of visits by households, 
which is much greater in 1999 ￿ even for non-surface waterpoints.  
 
In the next section, we present statistics on waterpoints accessed and the number of visits by 
households to different waterpoints by satellite camp herds, as opposed to base camp 
movements that we just examined.  Tables 9 & 10 present data on number and types of 
waterpoints used by satellite camp herds, and the total number of visits broken down by 
visits to surface and non-surface waterpoints.  Figure 2 in the appendix presents a graphic 
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NH  50 31  19  0 102 
KA  26 19 2  3  97 
LL  60 29  15  15 115 
DG  15 4  3  8 34 
SM  39 10  21  6  60 
NG  14 2  12  0 53 
 












NH  49 33  12  0  85 
KA  20  12  4  3  96 
LL  68  12  38  14  146 
DG  17  6  2  7  38 
SM  34 12  13  5  58 
NG  14  1  12  1  47 
*#WP Total does not equal the sum of hand-dug, surface, and borehole points in 1999; in DG this is due to 
households accessing machine-dug wells, and in LL, private wells (2) and private taps (1). 
 
Compared with base camp, in general more waterpoints were used by satellite camp herds, 
roughly following the same rank of total water points used with the exception of LL, which 
jumps from third place to first.  The number of waterpoints used in DG, KA, LL, and NH 
are at least 30% greater for satellite vs. base camp herds, whereas the number of points is 
roughly similar for base and satellite herds in NG and SM.  Households in LL relied on a 
relatively large number of hand-dug wells, followed by surface water and boreholes.   
Households in DG and KA used a relatively small number of surface water points, and 
relied more heavily on hand dug wells, and relatively more boreholes in DG.  As with base 
camp waterpoint use, there were a large number of surface waterpoints used by households 
in SM and NG.  Households in NH also named a fair number of surface waterpoints, but 
almost twice as many hand-dug well waterpoints.   The total number of visits in 1999 to 
different waterpoints is greater in DG and LL, as expected,  and lower in NG, NH, also as 
expected, and roughly unchanged in KA and SM.  
 
 
Data on permission, limits and exchanges for S92 and S99 are given below in Tables 11a,b, 
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DG  15  10 1  4 34 9 25  74 
KA  26  15  6  4 100  43 52 52 
LL  60  0  0  60  115  110  0        0 
NG  14  1  0 13  53  50 1  2 
NH  50  33  2  15  102  23 75 74 
SM  39  1  0 38  61  59 1  2 
 
Table 11b:  Permission, By Water Point, S99 
 
















DG  17  12  1  4  38  6 32 84 
KA  20 7  6  7  96 61 35 36 
LL  68  0  0  68  146  146 0 0 
NG 14  2  0  12  47  45 2 4 
NH  49  39  4  6  85 17 68 80 
SM 34  3  0  31  58  55 3 5 
 
As with base camp points, permission was required at majority of points in DG, KA and 
NH.  The percentage of points where permission was required for at least some herders in 
DG is slightly lower vis-￿-vis the case for base camp across both years, slightly higher for 
NH, and higher in KA.  As with base camp herds, no permission was required at points in 
LL in either year.  Permission was required at one point each in SM and NG ￿ the same 
points named by the same households as those for B92 ￿ and by two and three points 
respectively in 1999.      
 
Permission was required at roughly the same number of waterpoints in S99 and S92 in DG 
and SM.  The number of waterpoints where all were permission was required either by all 
or some users was slightly greater in NH as expected, but lower in KA; we expected 
permission to actually be greater in KA in 1999.  On the other hand, the proportion of 
households in KA actually requesting permission decreased, which may be partially 
explained by the fact that a larger percentage of waterpoints were ￿mixed￿ and lower 
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Table 12a:  Limits where Permission Required, S92  
 











% of hh￿s 
facing 
Limits 
DG 3  3  5 25  11  44 
KA 11  7 3  52  36  69 
LL n/a  n/a  n/a  0  n/a  n/a 
NG  0  0  1 1 0  0 
NH 2  3  30 75 6  8 
SM  1  0  0 1 1 100 
   
 
Table 12b:  Limits where Permission Required, S99 
    
  Waterpoints Households 










% of hh￿s 
facing 
Limits 
DG 4  4  5 32  13  41 
KA 9  3  1 35  23  66 
LL n/a  n/a  n/a  0  n/a  n/a 
NG 0  0  2  2  0  0 
NH 2  2 39 68  4  6 
SM 0  0  3  3  0  0 
 
 
Table 13a:  Exchanges where Permission Required, S92  
 












% of hh￿s 
that Gave 
DG 11  0  0  25  25  100 
KA 6  5  10  52  18  35 
LL n/a  n/a n/a  0  n/a  n/a 
NG  1 0  0 1  1  100 
NH 1  1  33  75  2  3 
SM  1 0  0 1  1  100 
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Table 13b:  Exchanges where Permission Required, S99  
   












% of hh￿s 
that Gave 
DG 13  0  0 32 32 100 
KA 5  2  6  35  8  23 
LL n/a  n/a  n/a 0 n/a n/a 
NG 1  0  1  2  1  50 
NH 4  0  39  68  5 7 
SM 1  0  2  3  1  33 
 
As with base camp mobility, the majority of cases where people gave something to access 
water points occurred in DG (100% of the people gave at 11 of 15 total waterpoints) and 
KA (33% of the people gave at 11 of 21 waterpoints) in 1992.  In NH, exchanges occurred 
at 4 of 43 waterpoints.  In DG, all households gave something to access waterpoints at S99 
and S92 points, mirroring the B92 and B99 observations.  
 
The number of waterpoints with limits in DG is greater at S99 vs. S92 points; the two 
additional points appearing in 1999 both imposed limits on at least some households.   
However, more households went to  waterpoints without limits, so that the percentage of 
households at waterpoints with limits was in fact lower for S99 vs. S92.  In KA, though 
there were fewer total waterpoints with limits for S99 vs. S92, a larger percentage of these 
waterpoints were visited by households.  As in DG, a slightly lower percentage of 
households visited waterpoints with limits.   
 
The total number of waterpoints where at least some households gave something to access 
the point remains unchanged between S99 and S92 (26).  Nonetheless, the percentage of 
households actually exchanging something to access waterpoints increases slightly from 31 
to 34%; the percentage remains the same in DG (100%), decreases in KA (from 35 to 23%), 
and increases in NH (from 3 to 7%).  It is interesting to note that the same total number of 
households gave something in both S92 and S99 (47); the difference largely stems from the 
fact that the total number of household visits to points where permission was required 
decreased from S92 to S99.  Basically exchanges remained at the same level in S99 
compared to S92, even though the total number of visits increased and visits requiring 
permission declined in percentage terms. 
 
As with the B92 data, access to waterpoints can be characterized as essentially complete in 
NG, SM, and LL, and to a lesser extent, NH, where permission is required of at least some 
households, but only a few waterpoints impose limits or require exchanges.  It is only in KA 
and DG where access can be characterized as incomplete, costly for some members, and 
where degree of access and completeness of rights differs among households accessing the 
same waterpoint.  Waterpoints accessed by households in KA and DG differ themselves in a 
rather interesting way.  In DG, access is basically costly for all households at waterpoints 
that require permission, but only about half face limits; whereas in KA, exchanges to access 
the waterpoints is much more limited, but a much higher percentage of households face 
limits.  Finally, it appears that both exchanges and limits are more frequent at waterpoints 
used as satellite points.   19
 
Summary of Permission, Exchanges and Limits: 
 
By simply looking at the descriptive statistics, there is very little in the way of general 
conclusions.  The main large differences are in the total number of points used and in the 
total number of points visited by households, across camp types and across years.  That is, 
more points are used for satellite camp vs. base camp, 204 vs. 107 for 1992, and 202 vs. 114 
for 1999.  And, though the total number of points accessed is only slightly larger for 1999 
(316 vs. 311), the total number of household visits increases in 1999 vs. 1992 (893 visits vs. 
743).   In fact, the total number of visits to different satellite camp points is approximately 
the same in both years; the difference in visits per year stem largely from many more points 
visited for base camps in 1999.    
 
Of the three areas where permission, exchanges and limits are important, we find that these 
transaction costs increase both for base and satellite camps in NH, and decrease for both 
base and satellite camps in DG.  Households located in the KA area face higher transactions 
costs at base camp as expected, but lower costs in satellite camp movements.  These results 
are roughly consistent with our main hypothesis regarding how flexible access rules 
operate.  Nonetheless, the change across years is rather limited except for DG.  However, 
the fact that at least some waterpoints in NH, DG and KA discriminated among households 
in terms of permission, exchange and limits also suggests that access may be contingent.   
Overall, then, there is more evidence to suggest that rights are incomplete ￿ irrespective of 
the ￿state of the world￿￿ and limited evidence to suggest that they are contingent and 
related to spatial diversity.  In table 14 below, we present transaction costs indices for base 
camp, satellite camp, and total, calculated using the observations on household visits on 
permission, exchanges, and limits.  Base and satellite camp transactions costs were simply 
summed to give a total transaction cost figure.   
 
Table 14:  Transactions Costs of Mobility 
 
   Total, 1999  Satellite, 1999 Base, 1999 Total, 1992 Satellite, 1992 Base, 1992 
NH 2.08  1.04  1.03 1.65  0.80  0.85 
KA 2.39  1.29  1.10 2.55  1.74  0.81 
LL 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
DG 2.79  0.79  2.00 4.42  1.82  2.60 
SM 0.03  0.03  0.00 0.04  0.02  0.02 
NG 0.08  0.02  0.06 0.08  0.02  0.06 
 
Thus far, we have presented figures on NDVI values and spatial and seasonal variation in 
NDVI, transactions costs of mobility and actual mobility undertaken by households in the 
1991-1992 drought year and the 1999-2000 ￿normal￿ year.   We have hypothesized that 
transactions costs of access would be higher in regions that experienced less spatial and 
seasonal variation; data is roughly consistent, though measured transactions costs were not 
important in three (LL, SM and NG) of the six communities.   We now need to relate these 
indicators back to waterpoint usage by households.  In Table 15, the first two columns are 
the differences in total waterpoint and satellite camp visits, which is simply the total 
observed at the community level in 1999 minus 1992.  Given that cropping and other 
activities may be important drivers in base camp movements, we separately consider 
satellite movements as we believe these will mirror more closely changes in agro-climatic 
conditions.  We also calculated the difference between satellite waterpoint visits in 1999   20
minus those in 1992 for each household, and report the average difference across 
communities; this variable allows us to separate household-fixed effects from weather 
pattern effects better than the total waterpoint visit variable does.  In the fourth column, we 
give the percentage change in rainfall in 1999 vs. 1992.  To aid interpretation, in the fifth 
column we report the percentage change in spatial variability, where spatial variability is 
captured by the negative of the 9 category contagion index (recalling that the contagion 
index increases as patchiness decreases).  The sixth column gives the percentage change in 
seasonal variability as defined above.  The final column gives percent changes in satellite 
transactions costs; changes in total and satellite transactions costs have the same sign, so we 







Table 15:  Changes between 1999 and 1992 
 
 
























NH -3  -17  -0.53 2  -17  -8  26 
KA 61  -1  -0.07  7  -23          -1  -6 
LL 77  31  1.03 17  36  5  0 
DG 7  4  0.13 15  15  22  -37 
SM 7  0  0.06 11  10  -13  -27 
NG 29  -6  -0.2 8 -11 -27 1.3 
 
As noted above, NDVI increases in all villages in 1999 vs. 1992; total visits increases in all 
communities as well, except North Horr, which had the second lowest percentage increase 
vis-￿-vis 1992.  Spatial variability is nearly perfectly correlated with total satellite visits; in 
all three areas with lower spatial variability, both the change in community level visits and 
per household satellite visits decrease. For the two communities with large positive changes 
in spatial variability, total satellite visits increase.  In SM, there was no or very slight 
decrease in satellite visits, but an increase in spatial variability.   
 
Changes in seasonal and spatial variability have the same sign in five of six areas; in SM 
spatial variability increases very slightly, but seasonal variability decreases quite a bit.   
Also, in NG, spatial variability is virtually unchanged, but seasonal variability decreases 
substantially; total water point visits actually increase in NG, but satellite visits decline 
slightly, more closely following the small declines in spatial variability rather than the large 
decline in seasonal variability.  On the other hand, the seasonal variability declines only 
slightly compared to changes in spatial variability in KA, more closely in line with the 
slight decrease in satellite visits there.   21
 
Changes in satellite transactions costs, which we also expect to be influenced by spatial 
variability appear well-correlated with changes in spatial and seasonal variability, with the 
exception of KA.  Transactions costs increase where spatial and seasonal variability 
decrease in NH and NG, and decrease in DG, where spatial and seasonal variability 
increase.  It is worth emphasizing that there are few transactions costs in NG, SM and none 
in LL, so changes in transactions costs there do not provide much information.  Of the three 
areas with significant transactions costs, then, changes in transactions costs coincide with 
predictions in two of three cases, with KA being the exception. 
 
4. Estimation  Results   
 
In this section, we estimate mobility equations, where the dependent variable is the number 
of visits by a household to different waterpoints, separately for base camp and satellite 
camp herds.  Estimations are for 1999 only, as household-level data was available only for 
that year. 
   
Mobility is hypothesized to be a function of household-specific variables as well as the 
community-wide climatic conditions or transactions costs described above.  Household-
level variables include the age of the household head (age), the number of males in the 
household over the age of 14 ( 14 males ), the number of large ruminants (cattle and camel) 
managed by the herder lrum, the number of small ruminants (goats and sheep) managed by 
the herder srum, the proportion of the total flock that is owned by the herder 
PropHerdOwn , a measure of assets held by the household ( ) Assets , and whether or not 
the herder owns any cropland (cropyn).  Age of the household head may proxy two 
offsetting influences; older herders may know more about the geographical distribution of 
resources as well as have more personal contacts in neighboring encampments, which 
should increase mobility.  On the other hand, long-distance herding is most often 
undertaken by younger males.  As the herder gets older and becomes less mobile himself, 
there are increased costs and risks associated with the long-distance movements that he no 
longer undertakes directly.  This may reduce mobility.  In the regressions, we use age and 
age squared (agesq) to allow for possible non-linear effects.  Also, as just noted, younger 
males over the age of 14 tend to be the actual herders, particularly for longer distance 
movements.  Thus, we include a variable for the number of males (besides the household 
head, if male) over the age of 14 to capture the amount of available family labor.   
 
To the extent that there are economies of scale in herding, we expect that larger herd sizes 
will increase mobility and thus the use of waterpoints.  However, these economies may well 
differ depending on the type of animal being herded.  Thus, we include variables for both 
large ruminants and small ruminants.  Given that the decision on how many large and small 
ruminants to hold may well be endogenous to the mobility decision, we test for statistical 
exogeneity between the mobility and stockholding decisions.   Instruments for large and 
small ruminant holdings include a dummy for whether or not the household head is female 
(Gender HH Head (1=Male)), where it is expected that female-headed households are less 
likely to hold larger herds both because, given societal norms, females are likely to have 
less experience with the full range of activities associated animal production (though, 
clearly, they are likely to have experience with milking), and because such households are 
likely to be less wealthy (Smith et al., 2001).  The number of children living outside of the 
community,  kidaway, is hypothesized to increase herd sizes, on the assumption that   22
migrants increase the wealth of the household.  Human capital variables, such as the number 
of adults in the family (phh), the education level of the household head (eduhead), and an 
index capturing the years of education of other adults in the household (eduhh), are all 
hypothesized to increase herd sizes.  Tests of exogeneity, following the standard Durbin￿
Wu￿Hausman procedure, generally led us to not reject statistical exogeneity, but the 
instruments performed fairly poor, as well.  Thus, regression results reported below include 
both the lrum, srumspecification, and a specification including only the instruments.   
 
Next, to the extent that herding contracts suffer from moral hazard and/or adverse selection 
problems, we would expect that mobility would be a positive function of the proportion of 
the total herd managed that is actually owned by the herder.  Household assets, such as the 
number of small shops and additional houses located in towns owned by the household, 
number of bicycles and radios owned, the number of consumer durables such as beds, 
tables, etc., and a dummy for whether or not a household has a bank account, may either 
have a positive or negative impact on mobility.  On the one hand, greater wealth may enable 
the household to negotiate and enforce herding arrangements that reduce moral hazard; by 
credibly threatening to monitor and punish poor herding, for instance.  On the other hand, 
more assets may increase the productivity of household labor in a wide variety of activities, 
potentially raising the relative opportunity costs of engaging in mobility. 
 
Finally, we include a dummy for whether or not the household ￿owns￿ (has usufruct rights 
over) cropland.  To the extent that cropping increases the costs of remaining sedentary ￿ 
particularly for base camp herds that tend to be in closer proximity to cropland ￿ we expect 
that this will increase mobility.  On the other hand, like household assets, cropping may 
increase the opportunity costs of labor; also, crop residues may partially substitute for 
grazing.  The impact of this variable is thus ambiguous. 
 
Community-level climate variables include the measure of contagion index using 9 
categories ( 9 cont ), the measure of seasonal variability captured by the coefficient of 
variation of NDVI values through the year ( NDVI CV ), and a variable capturing NDVI in 
1999 relative to the long-term average NDVI (Rel NDVI − ).  We also present results for a 
second specification, where we use the transaction costs variable in place of the climate 
variables,  ( ) , TCb s , where b refers to base camp transactions costs and s refers to satellite 
transactions costs.  By using this community-level indicator of transactions costs across 
possible waterpoints, we implicitly assume that the individual household cannot influence 
whether or not permission, exchanges and/or limits occur at any one waterpoint.  In other 
words, the aggregate index of transactions costs within is intended to capture an exogenous 
￿supply-side￿ cost of access within the area.  
 
Given the nature of the data ￿ where household level movements varied between 0 and 6, 
we need to consider the appropriate regression model specification.  Below we report results 
using the Poisson regression model.  We chose the Poisson regression model, as there was 
no evidence of over-dispersion and little evidence of ￿excess zeros￿
7.   
                                                             
7 We tested the hypothesis that the dispersion parameter, alpha, calculated for a negative binomial regression 
for both satellite and base camp movements equals zero (meaning that the Poisson is the correct model), and in 
all cases, we fail to reject the hypothesis that alpha=0.  We were also concerned about possible ￿excess zero￿  
values.  However, for base camp movements, 11% of households did not engage in mobility; if households 
were spread evenly over the 7 categories, this figure would be 14%; so there is no indication of excess zeros.  
For satellite camp, 18% of households were not mobility, which also gives little indication of excess zeros.  
Therfore, we present results for the Poisson regression models.     23
 
Table 16-17 gives results for the four different specifications for satellite camp movements; 
climate vs. transactions costs specifications, with lrum,  srum and separately with 
instruments for lrum, srum.   
Table 16:  Poisson Regression Results, Satellite Camp Herd Movements, 1999 
(with lrum and srum) 
 
 
Satellite WP Visits    Satellite WP Visits   
Coefficient z-stat   Coefficient z-stat 
age  -.0344* -2.09   -.0376*  -2.30 
agesq  .00037*   2.32    .0004*   2.61 
14 males   .0403   1.11    .0501   1.20 
asset  -.0588* -2.31   -.0489**  -1.88 
lrum   .0061   2.33    .0076*   3.09 
srum  -.0022 -0.69   -.0046  -1.27 
PropHerdOwn   -.2128 -0.93   -.3871**  -1.95 
land   -.0593 -0.33   -.6821*  -6.70 
Rel NDVI −   33.0080*   4.76      
CoV NDVI −   -.9612 -0.72      
9 cont   -.0221* -2.64      
TC Access −        -.3343*  -3.33 
constant  -30.1977*  -4.27    2.5274*   5.98 
         
Observations 167      167   
Wald Chi




0.413     0.352   
Pseudo R
2 0.1248      0.1018   
 
*  : 5% significance 
**: 10% significance 
   24
Table 17:  Poisson Regression Results, Satellite Camp Herd Movements, 1999 
(with instruments) 
 
Satellite WP Visits    Satellite WP Visits   
Coefficient z-stat   Coefficient z-stat 
age  -.0426* -2.51    -.0543  *  -3.09 
agesq   .0004*   2.63     .0006 *   3.43 
14 males    .0395   0.87      .0246    0.51 
asset  -.0729* -2.76    -.0616  *  -2.31 
PropHerdOwn   -.2347 -1.00    -.5154  *  -2.19 
land   -.0766 -0.46    -.7847  *  -7.19 
Rel NDVI −    38.5602 *   5.63       
CoV NDVI −   -.0560   -0.04       
9 cont   -.0245 *  -2.83       
TC Access −          -.3441 *  -3.12 
Gender    .1312    1.15    -.0143   -0.12 
phh   .0355    1.60      .0526*    2.18 
eduhead   -.0343   -1.63    -.0216   -0.90 
eduhh   .0026    0.17     .0096    0.55 
kidaway  -.0972   -1.46    -.0587   -0.88 
constant  -35.6221*   -5.13     2.9321*    6.29 
          
Observations 165      165   
Wald Chi




0.432     0.356   
Pseudo R
2 0.1327      0.1034   
 
As we can see, the specification with climate variables performs better on various goodness 
of fit criteria; this is expected given that climate variables differ among all communities, 
whereas the transactions costs differ primarily only among three of the six communities. In 
all specifications, mobility is higher where relative rainfall is higher ￿ perhaps a surprise to 
some.  Conceptually this makes sense; the greater the available resources in transit and at 
different destinations, the more likely it is to move.   Greater spatial variability increases 
mobility, as we expect, but seasonal variability has little impact.  When replacing the 
climatic variables with the transactions costs, higher transactions costs consistently lead to 
lower satellite camp mobility.  In terms of household variables, mobility declines at an 
increasing rate with the age of the household head, indicating that moral hazard problems 
associated with labor outweigh benefits from experience.  More household assets and 
whether or not the household engages in crop farming also lead to reduced mobility, a result 
consistent across specifications.  Finally, larger herds of large ruminants increases mobility, 
but small ruminants herd size has no statistically significant impact.  When replacing the 
large ruminants and small ruminants with instruments, we note that most variables are not 
significant, with the exception of household education in one specification (higher 
education of household adults, less mobility) and greater household labor (leading to more 
mobility).  Interestingly, males over 14 does not increase mobility for satellite herds; 
whether the household head is female or whether there are children who have migrated for 
wage work have no effect. 
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Table 18 and 19 presents results for the four different specifications for base camp 
movements  
 
Table 18:  Regression Results, Base Camp Herd Movements, 1999 
(with lrum and srum) 
 
Base WP Visits    Base WP Visits   
Coefficient z-stat   Coefficient z-stat 
age  -.0301   -1.33    -.0207  -0.91  
agesq   .0003    1.39      .0002   0.94  
14 males    .0612    1.36      .0260   0.59  
asset   .0156    0.75       .0083   0.38  
lrum    .0085 *   2.68     .0055*   2.09  
srum  -.0062   -1.39    -.0015  -0.32  
PropHerdOwn    .0349    0.10     .4073   1.24  
land   -.2269** -1.67   -.3638*  -3.79   
Rel NDVI −   -.7033   -0.10       
CoV NDVI −   -5.4779 *  -3.70       
9 cont   -.0025   -0.30       
TC Access −        -.0535  -0.82   
constant   2.7469    0.40     1.0786**  1.71  
         
Observations 167      167   
Wald Chi




0.197     0.133   
Pseudo R
2 0.0592      0.0386   
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Table 19:  Regression Results, Base Camp Herd Movements, 1999 
(wit instruments) 
 
Base WP Visits    Base WP Visits   
Coefficient z-stat   Coefficient z-stat 
age   -.0579*  -2.70        
agesq    .0005*   2.70        
14 males     .0544    1.14        
asset   -.0014   -0.07        
PropHerdOwn     .0875    0.28        
land    -.1563   -1.11        
Rel NDVI −    -2.3213   -0.30        
CoV NDVI −    -5.3593*  -3.64        
9 cont     .0033    0.41        
TC Access −          
Gender     .2605*    2.38        
phh     .0324    1.41        
eduhead    -.0188   -0.94        
eduhh   -.0528*   -2.59        
kidaway    .1736*    3.15        
constant    4.6490   0.61       
          
Observations 165        
Wald Chi




0.261        
Pseudo R
2 0.0818         
 
As with the satellite mobility equations, specifications including the climate variables 
generally give better goodness of fit than those including transactions costs alone.  
However, in these equations, relative NDVI and spatial variation ￿ both significant in 
explaining satellite camp mobility ￿ are generally insignificant.  Instead, base camp 
mobility appears to be driven by seasonal variation.  Contrary to expectations, however, 
greater seasonal variation appears to reduce base camp mobility.  It is possible that greater 
seasonal variability is correlated with greater cropping, and that more cropping reduces 
mobility; we simply do not have community-wide cropping patterns with which to test this 
relationship.  Transactions costs have a negative coefficient, but are never statistically 
significant.  Household-level variables appear somewhat more important than in the satellite 
mobility equations.  Again, age of household head reduces mobility at an increasing rate, 
though this impact is only statistically significant in two of the four specifications.  Also 
similar to the satellite case is the fact that large ruminants increase mobility whereas small 
ruminants have a consistently negative, but never significant, impact.  Mobility is greater 
where the household head is male and in households with children who have migrated for 
wage work (a proxy for household wealth), and negatively related to education of the 
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5. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we have examined data on herd mobility in northern Kenya to better 
understand the factors promoting or inhibiting mobility during both drought and ￿normal￿ 
years.  Basic statistics on herd movements indicate that there is indeed not much difference 
between the total number of waterpoints accessed in drought vs. ￿normal￿ years, but that the 
total number of visits to different waterpoints by households generally is greater during 
normal vs. drought years￿ substantially so in certain communities.  Another difference is in 
the use of waterpoints by base vs. satellite camp herds.  During drought years, base camp 
herd movements are far lower than during normal years, whereas satellite camp herd 
movements remain roughly constant across both drought and normal years.   
 
A robust result is the positive effect of relative NDVI levels on both base and satellite herd 
movements ￿ better relative conditions within an area increase mobility.  Greater spatial 
variability does indeed lead to greater herd mobility for satellite herds, as evidenced both in 
the significant coefficient in the 1999 herd mobility equations as well as the descriptive 
statistics comparing 1999 with 1991-1992.  Spatial variability appears to have a more 
limited impact on base camp mobility.   On the other hand, seasonal variability has a limited 
impact on satellite camp mobility, but, unexpectedly, has a strong negative impact on base 
camp mobility.  It is possible that seasonal variation in NDVI is positively correlated with 
the expanse of cultivated lands in the area, and to the extent that a large proportion of 
cultivated land limits base camp mobility, this may explain the negative sign. Higher 
transactions costs, here captured by the need to ask permission, face limits, or make 
exchanges at waterpoints within an area, always lead to lower mobility for satellite camp 
herds, but have no impact on base camp herd movements.  Altogether, results suggest that 
climate variables are indeed important in explaining herd movements, but are not 
necessarily consistent with anectdotal evidence ￿ and received ￿wisdom￿ ￿ on mobility.  
Mobility is not necessarily higher in drought years, and indeed total mobility is little 
changed for three of six communities when comparing the normal vs. drought year.   
Furthermore, long-distance movements correlate well with difference in spatial and 
seasonal variability, but not with drought vs. non-drought years; in fact, satellite mobility is 
higher in drought years only in those communities with higher spatial and seasonal variation 
in NDVI.  Given the dataset, it is impossible to recover the impact of mobility on livestock 
production, but evidence presented above suggests that focusing on drought year mobility 
may be misleading at best.  Mobility is reduced when spatial and seasonal variability is very 
low, which does not necessarily correspond to drought years.   Further analysis determining 
the relationship between conflicts and spatial and seasonal variability, as well as herd 
productivity and variability is required, particularly given the fact that many researchers and 
policymakers are overwhelmingly preoccupied with mobility in drought years only, based 
on anecdotes alone. 
 
With respect to household level variables, the number of large ruminants held by the 
household leads to greater mobility, indicating that there may be economies of scale in 
mobility for these herds.  The number of small ruminants always has a negative coefficient, 
but is never significant.  Interestingly, the number of males in the family has no statistically 
significant impact on herd mobility, whereas satellite mobility consistently declines at an 
increasing rate with the age of the household head.  The latter indicates that benefits to 
experience are outweighed at some point, either because age makes mobility more difficult 
or because engaging labor for satellite herd movements becomes more likely as the 
household head ages, and such labor may be subject to moral hazard.  The same does not   28
hold, however, for base camp herds where the household head can more easily monitor herd 
condition and directly implement decisions on mobility.  Assets and whether or not the 
household engage in cropping generally have a negative impact on mobility, indicating that 
alternative activities increase the opportunity costs of engaging in mobility, particularly 
longer distance term mobility captured by satellite herd movements.  While using the same 
dataset, this result is in apparent contradiction to the results presented in Smith et al., 2001, 
who hold that cropping and other activities are undertaken mainly by those households 
whose herds have been decimated by drought
8.  The one-period results for 1999 rather 
indicate that alternative activities are relatively attractive precisely to those households with 
a higher asset base.  In fact, the simple Pearsson correlation coefficients of household assets 
are negative with respect to large and small ruminant holdings, as well as herd mobility for 
the sample in total, though this does mask differences among communities.  Still, this 
contradiction highlights the need to collect data across time and space, since recall data is 
usually only partial (in this dataset, there is recall data on mobility, but not on most of the 
other household-level indicators), and other supporting data, as in the Smith et al.(2001) 
study, is based on perceptions of various risks, with no attempt to match perceptions to 
either input decisions or actual outcomes.   
 
Thus, without further information on the links between mobility and animal productivity 
and livestock income, it is difficult to draw more firmly policy relevant conclusions.   
Nonetheless, mobility seems to be quite important in this system in general, and satellite 
camp herd mobility appears to be more important during years of greater spatial and 
seasonal variability.  Evidence suggests that exercising access rights to satellite camp 
waterpoints is relatively more costly than to base camp waterpoints, and that transactions 
cost generally increase when spatial and seasonal variability decrease.  There is no reason to 
believe that there should be concerted policy efforts or programs designed to reduce these 
transactions costs ￿ since such costs may indeed reflect opportunity costs of scarce 
resources.  Instead, such a policy conclusion would require determining whether the 
transaction costs are ￿too high￿ in a socially optimal sense.   Instead, policy efforts should 
focus on developing secondary markets for both substitute forages and livestock outputs in 
general ￿ but not be preoccupied with drought years in particular.   
 
 
                                                             
8 It is interesting to note that in the Smith et al. (2001) study, there is little evidence to support the notion that 
subjective assessments of climatic risk differ substantially from objective risks assessments, or even, given the 
capacity to mitigate and cope, how an ￿objective￿ indicator of ￿drought￿ might be developed.  Perceptions of 
risk of drought and ￿rainfall contours￿ presented in the article do not show significant differences as captured 
in Figures 3a and 3b (it is not clear how rainfall contours map into incidence of drought),  particularly for the 
case of northern Kenya)  Subjective assessments appear more detailed, but rainfall data (from an unknown 
source) has been interpolated, as indicated in the article itself, meaning that spatial variation has been 
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Figure 1: Number and Types of Waterpoints Used by Base Camp Herds 
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